

# POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

## COMPENDIUM

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## 1. Introduction – the goals and aims of the course

This compendium is developed for the BA course *Political Institutions: Western countries, The European Union and International Organizations* (PI). The course deals with political systems and their interactions. Its focus is on providing students with an understanding of how political systems work as well as the causes and consequences of institutional differences for the representativeness and efficiency of political decision-making processes.

The course contains three core elements: 1) national political systems and institutional differences between these systems; 2) the political system of the EU; and 3) international cooperation and the interaction between political systems.

The first bloc of the course provides insights into the political systems of selected countries and the significance of key institutional differences across political systems. This includes differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, federal states and unitary states, and the modes of operation in parliaments and governments.

The second bloc of the course focuses on the EU's political system, its institutions and the core policies that have been developed. After an introduction to the political system of the EU, this bloc addresses executive, legislative and judicial politics in the EU. In addition, the bloc deals with the current state of democracy in the EU and elections to the European Parliament.

The third bloc of the course concentrates on the interaction between political systems and transnational politics. In particular, we focus on theories aimed at explaining the formation and operation of international organizations as well as different types of transnational governance.

The goal of the course is to give students a general knowledge of how political institutions at various levels of governance function, develop and influence democratic representation and decision-making. Specifically, the course aims to give students the following competences:

- The student must be able to describe the political system of selected Western countries, the EU and international organizations.
- The student must be able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in different institutional contexts.
- The student must be able to compare key empirical differences between political systems, identifying their differences and similarities.
- The student must be able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories.
- The student must be able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.
- The student must be able to apply the theories of the course to analyze empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.

These overall learning objectives can be divided into three major headings (as illustrated in Table 1): theoretical knowledge, empirical knowledge and an ability to apply theories to empirical material.


**Table 1. Overall learning objectives for the course**

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<p>The student must be able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in and through political institutions.</p> <p>The student must be able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories</p>	<p>The student must be able to describe the political system of selected Western countries, the EU and selected international organizations.</p>	<p>The student must be able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.</p> <p>The student must be able to apply the theories of the course to analyze empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction. The goal here is to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.</p>

## 2. The relation of the course to other courses on the BA in Political Science

The course is closely connected to other BA courses in political science at Aarhus University. Figure 1 places PI in relation to other courses taught on the BA education through a simplified version of an input-output model. It should be noted that the model is a simplified presentation and certain overlaps will occur between the different courses. *General Political Science* (Almen Statskundskab) deals with the input side of the political system. It presents knowledge of and theories about social cleavages, opinion formation, the role of public opinion and political participation. *Public Policy* (Offentlig Politik) focuses on the outcome side – political decisions, policies, regimes and reforms that are treated as the dependent variable. *International Relations* (International Politik) deals with the international systems and how states interact and conduct their foreign policies. Focus is on the structure of the international system and the role of conflicts and cooperation between states. *Political Institutions* focuses on what happens in the so-called ‘black box’ between demands expressed in civil society to policies influencing the living conditions in a society.

**Figure 1: The PI course role in the BA program**




### 3. The organization of the course

Studying what happens in a black box is per definition difficult. In PI, we open the black box by studying the way power is organized in central political institutions and how they operate in order to reach political decisions. We thus study the role of the structures as well as the modus operandi of selected political institutions.

The classic input-output models are primarily limited to and aimed at understanding domestic politics and distributive processes on this level. However, to give a comprehensive understanding of how the most important political institutions are structured and function, we need to acknowledge that modern governance is multilayered. There are multiple layers of authority from municipalities over nation states to supranational organizations. PI needs to draw on insight from Comparative Politics (CP) as well as International Relations (IR) to understand these different layers of authority and the way power is structured within as well as between states. The overall theoretical framework used to bridge CP and IR is theories of institutionalism. Institutionalism focuses on how institutions are created and their effects on behavior and policies.

PI is organized according to the different layers of governance in modern developed democracies, as shown in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Illustration of the structure of PI**



We begin the course with a general introduction to the concept of institutions and theories about the relationship between actors and institutions (L1). This general framework is relevant for all aspects of the course even though a somewhat different terminology is used in the different research traditions.

- In the first bloc (weeks 2-5), we focus on the national level of governance (we do not move below the national level, so we will not discuss municipalities). Empirically, we focus on Western democracies when applying typologies to describe national political institutions such as electoral systems, legislatures and executives.
- The second bloc (weeks 6-10) deals with the European Union as an example of supra-national level governance. The political system of EU will be explained in detail. This means that we will not only cover the central institutions and policies of the EU but also address the current state of democracy in the EU. After an introduction, the bloc covers executive, legislative and judicial politics in the EU.

- The third bloc (weeks 11-15) takes one further step towards studying political institutions beyond the nation state. Based on institutional theories, we discuss why states choose to create international organizations and whether and how states can control international organizations when they are first created. Empirically, we will draw on examples from the UN and NATO.

**Table 2. Organization of the course: Lectures and classes**

Week	Lecturer	Theme
L1 January 30	HHP	<b>Introduction: Institutionalism</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hall, Peter A. &amp; Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) 'Political science and the three new institutionalisms', <i>Political Studies</i> 44(5): 936-955 (20 pages) (online article).</li> <li>• Compendium comments (supplementary reading).</li> </ul>
C1		<b>Institutionalism and institutional change</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Koning, Edward Anthony (2016) 'The three institutionalisms and institutional dynamics: Understanding endogenous and exogenous change', <i>Journal of Public Policy</i>, 36(4): 639-664 (26 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
<b>Block 1: Political institutions in Western countries</b>		
L2 February 6	RS	<b>Electoral systems and party systems</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Repetition: Gallagher, M. (2014) 'Electoral systems', chapter 10 in Caramani (ed.), <i>Comparative Politics</i>. New York &amp; Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-172 (6 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> <li>• Caramani, D. (2014) 'Party systems', chapter 13 in Caramani (ed.), <i>Comparative Politics</i>. New York &amp; Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 216-229 (14 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> <li>• Benoit, K (2007) 'Electoral laws as political consequences', <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i> 10: 363-388 (36 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
C2		<b>Electoral systems and women's representation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• McAlister, I. &amp; Studlar, D. (2002) 'Electoral systems and women's representation: a long-term perspective', <i>Representation</i> 39(1): 3-14 (12 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
L3 February 13	HHP	<b>Legislatures</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sieberer, U. (2011) 'The institutional power of Western European parliaments: A multidimensional analysis', <i>West European Politics</i>, 34(4): 731-754 (24 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
C3		<b>Classifying legislatures</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dalton, R.J. (2015) 'Politics in Germany', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. &amp; Strøm, K. (eds.) <i>Comparative politics today. A world view</i>,</li> </ul>

		<p>11<sup>th</sup> ed. Pearson, pp. 279-284, 296, 304-308 (12 pages) (copy in compendium).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Schain, M.A. (2015) 'Politics in France', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. &amp; Strøm, K. <i>Comparative Politics today. A world view</i>, 11<sup>th</sup> ed. Pearson, pp. 223-224, 251-2257 (9 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> </ul>
L4 February 20	HHP	<p><b>Government regimes and accountability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hellwig, T. &amp; Samuels, D. (2007) 'Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes', <i>British Journal of Political Science</i>, 38(1): 65-90 (26 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
C4		<p><b>Electoral accountability in the US</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kousser, T. &amp; Ranney, A. (2015) 'Politics in the United States', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. &amp; Strøm, K. (eds.) <i>Comparative politics today. A world view, 11<sup>th</sup></i>, Pearson, pp. 713-715, 734-739, 748-749 (11 pages) (copy in compendium)</li> <li>Trethan, P. (2017, March 06) 'Powers and duties of the United States Congress. Setting the rules and laying down the law', ThoughtCo. <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/powers-of-the-united-states-congress-3322280">https://www.thoughtco.com/powers-of-the-united-states-congress-3322280</a> (also shared on blackboard) (2 pages)</li> <li>Trethan, P. (2017, April 04) 'The congressional committee system. Who's doing what?', ThoughtCo. <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/the-congressional-committee-system-3322274">https://www.thoughtco.com/the-congressional-committee-system-3322274</a> (also shared on blackboard) (2 pages)</li> <li>Longley, R. (2017, Feb. 23) 'Presidentially appointed jobs requiring Senate approval. That Senate part can get sticky', ThoughtCo. <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/presidentially-appointed-jobs-requiring-senate-approval-3322227">https://www.thoughtco.com/presidentially-appointed-jobs-requiring-senate-approval-3322227</a> (also shared on blackboard) (2 pages)</li> </ul>
L5 February 27	RS	<p><b>Federalism</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Loughlin, J. (2014) 'Federal and local government institutions', in Caramani (ed.) <i>Comparative politics</i>. New York &amp; Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 181-196 (16 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> <li>Beramendi, P. (2007) 'Federalism', in Boix, C. &amp; Stokes, S. (eds.), <i>Oxford handbook on comparative politics</i>. New York &amp; Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 752-781 (30 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> </ul>
C5		<p><b>Representation in federal systems</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wlezien, C. &amp; Soroka, S.N. (2011) 'Federalism and public responsiveness to policy', <i>Publius: The Journal of Federalism</i> 41(1): 31-52 (22 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
<b>Block 2: THE EU</b>		
L6	RS	<b>The political system of the EU</b>

March 6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix, S. &amp; Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 1-18.</li> <li>Hargreaves, S. &amp; Homewood, M.J. (2016) <i>EU law concentrate: Law revision and study guide</i>. Oxford University Press, pp. 1-20 (20 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> </ul>
C6		<p><b>What does the European Union do?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Alesina, A., Angeloni, I. &amp; Schuknecht, L. (2005) 'What does the European Union do?', <i>Public Choice</i> 123(3): 275-319 (44 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
L7 March 13	RS	<p><b>Executive politics in the EU</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix, S. &amp; Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 23-48.</li> </ul>
C7		<p><b>A new type of Commission?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Peterson, J. (2017) 'Juncker's political European Commission and an EU in Crisis', <i>JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies</i>, 55(2): 349-367 (18 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
L8 March 20	DF	<p><b>Legislative politics in the EU</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix, S. &amp; Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 49-75.</li> </ul>
C8		<p><b>Trilogue and fast-track procedure</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rasmussen, A. &amp; Reh, C. (2013) 'The consequences of concluding codecision early', <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i> 20 (7) (18 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
L9 April 3	DF	<p><b>Elections and democracy in the EU</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix, S. &amp; Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 105-157.</li> </ul>
C9		<p><b>Democratic deficit</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Follesdal, A. &amp; Hix, S. (2006) 'Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU', <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i>, 44(3): 533-562 (29 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
L10 April 10	DF	<p><b>Judicial politics in the EU</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix, S. &amp; Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 75-105.</li> <li>Dyevre, A. (2010) 'Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics', <i>European Political Science Review</i>, 2(2): 297-327 (31 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>

C10		<b>Trial exam</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No readings: Exam questions from 2016 (on blackboard).</li> </ul>
<b>Block 3: International Organizations</b>		
L11 April 17	DF	<b>Why do states create international institutions?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Keohane, R.O. (2011) 'After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy', reprinted in K.A. Mingst &amp; J.L. Snyder (eds.), <i>Essential readings in world politics</i>, 4th edition (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 292-319 (28 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> <li>Stein, A.A. (1982) 'Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world', <i>International Organization</i>, 36(2): 299-324 (26 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
C11		<b>Establishing international security cooperation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Schimmelfennig, F. (2016) 'NATO and Institutional theories of international relations', in: M. Webber &amp; A. Hyde-Price (eds.), <i>Theorising NATO. New perspectives on the Atlantic alliance</i>. London: Routledge, pp. 93-115 (23 pages) (e-book via AU Library).</li> </ul>
L12 April 24	DF	<b>Regional Integration</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Moravcsik, A. &amp; Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism', in A. Wiener &amp; T. Diez (eds.), <i>European integration theory</i>, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67-87 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> <li>Niemann, A. &amp; Schmitter, P.C. (2009) 'Neo-functionalism', in A. Wiener &amp; T. Diez (eds.), <i>European integration theory</i>, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-65 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> </ul>
C12		<b>The Euro-crisis</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis', <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 22(2): 177-192 (16 pages) (online article).</li> <li>Niemann, A. &amp; Ioannou, D. (2015) 'European economic integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism?', <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 22(2): 196-215 (20 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
L13 May 1	DF	<b>How do international institutions work?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Barnett, M. &amp; Finnemore, M. (2004) <i>Rules for the world</i>. Cornell Press. Ch. 1 and 2. (41 pages) (copy in compendium).</li> <li>Abbott, K.W. &amp; Snidal, D. (1998) 'Why states act through formal international organizations', <i>The Journal of Conflict Resolution</i> 42(1): 3-32 (28 pages) (online article).</li> </ul>
C13		<b>Trial exam</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No readings: Exam questions from 2017 (on blackboard).</li> </ul>
L14 May 15	DF	<b>International trade agreements</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>de Mesquita, B. (2014) <i>Principles of international politics</i>. Sage, Ch. 11, pp. 353-382 (30 pages) (E-book via AU-Library).</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hix, S. &amp; Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 302-331.</li> </ul>
C14		<p><b>The domestic politics of Brexit</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Putnam, R.D. (1988) 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. <i>International Organization</i>, 42(3): 427-460 (31 pages) (online article).</li> <li>Hoerner, J.M. (2017) 'Involvement of national parliaments will further complicate the Brexit deal'. <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/05/04/involvement-of-europes-national-parliaments-will-further-complicate-the-brexit-deal/">http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/05/04/involvement-of-europes-national-parliaments-will-further-complicate-the-brexit-deal/</a> (2 pages).</li> <li>Palmer, J. (2017) 'Tory Brexit is doomed. Corbyn has a chance to build the Europe he wants'. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/13/tory-brexit-doomed-corbyn-build-europe-austerity-labour">https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/13/tory-brexit-doomed-corbyn-build-europe-austerity-labour</a> (2pages).</li> </ul>
L15 May 22	DF	<p><b>Climate politics (45 min) and wrap up (45 min)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>de Mesquita, B. (2014) <i>Principles of international politics</i>. Sage, Chapter 8, pp. 267-292 (26 pages) (E-book via AU Library).</li> </ul>
C15		<p><b>Transnational climate politics (45min) and exam preparation (45 min)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hale, T. &amp; Roger, C. (2014) 'Orchestration and transnational climate governance', <i>The review of international organizations</i>, 9(1), 59-82 (online article).</li> </ul>

PI is organized as most other BA courses with four hours teaching per week: two hours of lectures and two hours of class discussions. The exam is a six-hour written exam, and after the course, students are expected to be able to describe political institutions and theories about them and to be able to compare these institutions and theories in a theoretically informed empirical analysis. The descriptive element of the course is thus strong, giving students an opportunity to gather empirical knowledge of various political institutions on the national as well as international level of governance.

To make the teaching activities support the achievement of the learning objectives, lectures will focus on providing knowledge of concepts, typologies and theories for defining, classifying and understanding the function and structure of political institutions, while classes will focus on applying these concepts, typologies and theories on empirical material.

Lectures as well as classes will be taught in English. The final exam can be written in Danish or English.

### Lectureres and coordinators

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If you have any practical questions, you are welcome to contact the coordinators.

### Class instructors

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## 4. Comments for the reading material

### **Week 1: Introduction to institutionalism**

#### *Lecture*

PI begins with an introduction to the role of institutionalism in political science and how it has developed. Here, the definition of institutions as well as the different positions on how institutions and actors stand in relation to each other is discussed.

Political institutions have always played a prominent role in political science. In the late 19th and early 20th century, scholars were concerned with describing formal political institutions such as constitutions, legislatures and administrative apparatuses. This tradition has been labeled 'old institutionalism' and was criticized as being too descriptive and not leading to cumulative knowledge and theory development. Political scientists, especially in the US, reacted by initiating the behavioral approach (behavioralism) in the years after World War II. Here, the importance of political institutions was either rejected or reduced, and it was argued that political behavior could not be explained or studied by reading formal rules but only by observing actual behavior. Political phenomena were explained by the aggregate behavior of individual (rational and strategic) actors. However, 'new institutionalism' evolved as a reaction to behavioralism around the 1980s. One of the reasons was that scholars found themselves unable to explain important political outcomes by only taking the individual interests of the actors into account. For instance, rational choice scholars of the US Congress found it difficult to explain coordination and cooperation among Members of Congress. 'New institutionalism' in general has a broader understanding of institutions, including informal institutions such as procedures and norms, and they also theorize more explicitly the relationship between actors and institutions.

In the text for the lecture, Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that the approach of 'new institutionalism' can be divided into three schools of institutionalism: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. They describe and compare the different schools, highlighting the most important differences and similarities. They also discuss the potential that these schools hold for explaining the creation and change of political institutions.

The new institutionalism has had a tremendous impact on political science. So much so that Pierson and Skocpol claim that 'we are all institutionalists now'.<sup>1</sup> The relevance and use of institutional approaches have perhaps been nowhere more profound than in the study of the European Union.

#### *Classes*

In the text for the first class, Koning argues that the common critique that institutionalism cannot explain institutional change is unwarranted. New institutionalism holds great potential for explaining change. He describes various mechanisms of institutional change outlined by the different institutional perspectives and suggests that these perspectives are brought together in a common

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<sup>1</sup> Pierson, P. and T. Skocpol (2002) 'Historical institutionalism in contemporary political science', in I. Katznelson and H.V. Miller (eds.) *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, New York: Norton, pp. 693-721.

framework he calls the sequential model of institutional change. In class, we will clarify the different explanations of institutional change and discuss the integrated model suggested by Koning.

*Learning objectives for week 1*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describe the three new institutional approaches</li> <li>• Discuss their differences and similarities</li> <li>• Discuss their strengths and weaknesses</li> </ul>		

**Bloc 1: Political institutions in Western countries**

In the first bloc we, introduce essential political institutions in Western countries. Specifically, we discuss four political institutions that are central for the way power is distributed and operates in political systems. These institutions are the electoral system, legislatures, executives and federalism. For each of these institutions, we discuss 1) how to classify them, 2) potential causes of variations and 3) potential consequences for representation and efficiency.

Week 2: Electoral systems

While parliaments and governments are in many ways the core institutions that make democracies function on an everyday basis, it is not given which parties enter parliament and, subsequently, form government. This is not least because the electoral rules governing how people vote and how these votes are translated into parliamentary seats vary greatly between countries. We will study what consequences the organization of electoral systems have on outcomes such as turnout and the representation of minority interests. In reality, the electoral system of a country is never neutral: It always benefits some groups in society over others. Given this inherent issue, it is vital to understand why some countries adopt one electoral system over another.

*Lecture*

This lecture addresses four primary questions: What is an electoral system? How do electoral systems work? Why do electoral systems matter? And why do electoral systems differ across countries? It begins with a brief overview of the key distinctions among electoral systems. Although you were already introduced to the topic in Pol.Intro, we begin with a refresher given the wide variety of electoral systems out there (hence, the repetition from Caramani). Crucially, this overview will also allow us to hone in on some of the electoral system characteristics that are especially important to outcomes that we may care about (such as inequality and minority representation). We then turn to a discussion of why different countries have ended up with different electoral systems using the Benoit article as our starting point. This view of electoral laws as political consequences will then be illustrated using a recent example from the UK.

*Classes*

In the lecture, we discuss some of the consequences of electoral systems, and we use the tutorial this week to focus on one of these effects: How does a country's electoral system affect women's representation in parliament? We will use the article by McAlister and Studlar (2002) to kick off a discussion about which factors seem to matter for the number of women elected to parliament. Yet, your own research will be essential to this discussion, as the exercise this week will have you updating the data in the article and conducting research on a country of your choice.

*Learning objectives of week 2*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe different types of electoral systems</li> <li>Describe causes of variation in electoral system types</li> <li>Describe some of the consequences of different electoral system types</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe factors that might shape women's legislative representation in developed countries</li> <li>Be familiar with general patterns in women's legislative representation as they relate to electoral systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discuss in which ways electoral systems might increase or decrease women's legislative representation</li> </ul>

Week 3: Legislatures

Almost all countries have some kind of legislature. Legislatures in Western countries are comparatively old and have served as inspiration for many younger legislatures around the world. Legislatures have been research objects in political science for centuries as scholars have asked how legislatures are organized, what they do and, not least, how powerful they are. During the era of old institutionalism, especially descriptive typologies and detailed single-case descriptions of the formal organization and procedures of legislatures were prominent. We now build on this research as studies of legislature move towards a newer institutionalist approach where informal as well as formal characteristics are taken into account and the search for explanations to the variation across legislatures has set in.

*Lecture*

In the lecture, you are provided with an overview of the relevant dimensions for describing legislatures such as the relationship between the legislature and the executive, the tasks of a legislature and the organizational differences in terms of chambers and committees. A more recent classification of legislatures proposed by Sieberer is presented, showing how legislatures may not only be classified into boxes of weak and strong legislatures but can also be measured on more dimensions regarding their institutional independence and power resources. Hereby, it becomes evident how legislatures not only circumscribe the behavior of legislative actors but are also products of powerful actors' interaction.

*Classes*

In the class for this week, you will read about the French and German legislatures to have detailed knowledge of these systems. In the exercise, you are asked to apply the theoretical knowledge from the lecture to describe and compare the French and German legislatures according to the dimensions presented in the lecture.

*Learning objectives for week 3*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify dimensions for classifying legislatures</li> <li>Discuss strengths and weaknesses of different typologies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Detailed knowledge of the French and German legislatures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use typologies to describe and classify legislatures</li> <li>Discuss potential causes and consequences of the institutional design of legislatures</li> </ul>

Week 4: Executives

A major theme for old institutionalist studies is the constitutional division of power between the executive and legislative powers. The most prominent dichotomy for describing these relations are presidential versus parliamentary regimes. Whereas many institutionalist studies have been occupied with how to classify regimes within these two broad categories and their subcategories, new institutionalism has drawn increased attention toward the consequences of different regime types for representation and efficiency. In this week, we discuss how regime types influence voters' ability to hold politicians to account in elections.

*Lecture*

In the lecture, you are introduced to the major differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes and the traditional critique of the representativeness and efficiency of these systems. Based on this common framework, the lecture uses the article by Hellwig and Samuels (2007) to discuss how different regimes offer voters different possibilities for holding decision-makers to account. The main theoretical argument is that electoral accountability depends on how easy it is to assign responsibility to various decision-makers as well as voters' ability to use their votes to act on that assignment. Voters not only need to know who is responsible; they also need to be able to sanction those who are responsible in elections. The authors argue that electoral accountability should thus be highest in systems with separation of powers (presidential systems), where elections for the executive and the legislature are held at the same time.

*Classes*

In the classes for this week, we focus on the case of the US. First, we continue the theme of the lecture by discussing the institutional strengths and weaknesses of electoral accountability in the US.

Second, we draw on the insights from last week, classifying and discussing the strengths of the US Congress.

*Learning objectives of week 4*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Define different types of government and executive-legislative relations</li> <li>• Define electoral accountability</li> <li>• Discuss potential strengths and weaknesses of parliamentary and presidential systems</li> <li>• Explain the potential impact of regime types on electoral accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explain the decision-making procedure and key institutional features in the US</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make a theoretically informed analysis of the institutional potential for electoral accountability in the US.</li> <li>• Make a theoretically informed comparison of the US legislature and other relevant Western legislatures</li> </ul>

Week 5: Federalism

So far, the course has concentrated on national-level political institutions such as legislatures and executives. These are clearly very important; yet, in many countries, power is not concentrated at the national level but is rather spread out across federal subunits (e.g. states, provinces and cantons). This week's focus on federalism will serve as an essential part of the national bloc – allowing us to grasp just how much of an impact federal structures have on the way other political institutions function in a country. What is more, it will also provide a helpful bridge to the EU bloc since it serves as an introduction to multi-level governance.

*Lecture*

The lecture explores the role of federalism in modern-day democracies, using the texts by Loughlin and Beramendi as an introduction to federalism and the major debates surrounding it in the literature. We begin by providing an overview of the main characteristics of federal as opposed to unitary states while distinguishing federalism from decentralization. We will then turn to outlining the historical origins of federalist institutions: Why have some countries chosen this particular mode of government, while others have not? Next, we will proceed to examine how federalist institutions affect the operation of democracy, in the process touching on some of the other discussions we have engaged in during the national bloc. Given the nature of federalism, we will also discuss how it has a profound effect on the distribution of resources across a federation. Finally, we will briefly discuss how traditional federalism (the topic of this lecture) might relate to the European Union (as the subject of the next lecture bloc).

*Classes*

As we discussed in the lecture, federalism has important implications for the way democracies work. One crucial implication relates to the extent of democratic accountability since it can be difficult in a federation to disentangle the issues that matter for elections at the federal versus subnational levels. The tutorial this week therefore focuses on the extent to which voters are able to sort out which policy actions and responsibilities belong to which levels of government. The discussion will begin from Wlezien and Soroka’s investigation of public responsiveness in Canada. In your groups, you will then conduct your own research on the Canadian federation to better understand not only how federalism works in practice, but also the difficulties in assigning responsibility for policy outcomes.

*Learning objectives of week 5*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe federalism and distinguish it from alternative forms of governance</li> <li>Discuss the relationship between federalism and decentralization</li> <li>Describe some potential causes and consequences of federalism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe the concept of accountability and its relationship to federalism</li> <li>Describe some of the complexities inherent in federalism using the Canadian example</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discuss the connection between public opinion and government responsibilities in a federation</li> </ul>

**Bloc 2: The European Union**

The second bloc introduces and examines the European Union (EU), which serves as an example of regional level governance. There are two major objectives in this section. First, we set out to provide a detailed introduction to the EU and its institutional and policy architecture. Second, we analyze different aspects of the EU, namely executive, legislative and judicial politics. The bloc will ensure that students are familiar with the EU as a political system (a major goal of the course in its own right). Moreover, students will be able to use perspectives from Comparative Politics to analyze and understand how the EU works.

Week 6: The political system of the EU

In this week, we introduce the EU as a political system. This involves both a brief overview of its historical development and an introduction to its institutional and policy architecture. It will therefore set the stage for the rest of the bloc, in which we will go into detail with the various topics introduced this week.

*Lecture*

We begin by discussing key developments of the European integration process, including treaty reforms and enlargement. In doing so, we aim to broadly sketch out how the EU came about and how it has changed over time. We then introduce the institutional architecture of the EU, providing an overview of the EU's key institutions (which will be fleshed out in the coming weeks). Next, we proceed to discuss the EU's policy architecture: Which policy areas are under the control of the EU? Which are shared by the EU and member states or coordinated between them? And which policy areas are outside of EU competences? Finally, we end with the question: how can we best understand the European Union? Is it similar to an international organization (such as the UN) or a federal state (such as the US)? This lecture thus sets the stage for the rest of the bloc.

*Classes*

One part of the lecture deals with the policy competences of the EU. While the EU of today does not have competences to be active in all policy areas, its competences have been widened substantially over the course of the European integration process. In this class, we take a closer look at the policy competences of the EU to identify areas in which it actually has a say and learn in which areas competences are located at the national level. To do so, we work with the article by Alesina and colleagues, which traces the development of the EU's policy competences and activities over the period from 1970 to 2000. In addition, the article helps us to assess whether public opinion about the transfer of competences to the EU level is in line with the EU's actual policy power. In group exercises, we will work with more recent data about the EU's policy activities and discuss what shared competences between the European and national levels will look like in the future.

*Learning objectives of week 6*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Understand theories on how the EU came about</li> <li>• Describe the broad theoretical frameworks on how politics in the EU works</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key moments in the development of the EU</li> <li>• The broad division of control over policy between the EU and member states</li> <li>• The EU's institutional architecture</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluate the attribution of policy competences to the EU level</li> <li>• Discuss the development of the EU's policy activities</li> <li>• Discuss the EU's future policy focus</li> </ul>

Week 7: Executive politics in the EU

After last week's introduction to the EU's general structure, we now zoom in on executive politics in the EU. We therefore pick up some of the themes from week 4, when we focused on national-level executives. But as we will see, although there are relevant parallels to the discussions from the national bloc, executive politics in the EU has some peculiar characteristics. In particular, understanding executive politics in the EU requires us to carefully unpack the relationship between

national and supranational executive power in the context of the EU's dual executive structure. As a result, we will also highlight numerous connections to discussions from the past two weeks about the process of European integration.

*Lecture*

In this lecture, we will concentrate on answering two major questions: What does executive politics look like in the EU? And why does the form of executive politics in the EU matter? We begin by briefly recapping the classical differences in executive power at the national level – that is, the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. We then discuss the limitations of that framework in trying to understand executive politics in the EU. That leads us to describe the nature of the Council of the European Union and the Commission as institutions, and to consider their respective relationships to the EU's member states. In the process, we discuss different theories of executive politics as well as concepts such as administrative and political accountability.

*Classes*

In class this week, we turn to examine recent trends in the nature of executive politics in the EU. In particular, we focus on the possibility that the current Juncker Commission is more 'politicized' than its predecessors and discuss why that might matter for our understanding of executive power in the EU. For your exercise, you will be asked to discuss these developments in relation to Brexit.

*Learning objectives of week 7*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand theories of executive politics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe the nature of the Council and the Commission as well as their respective relationships to the EU's member states</li> <li>Describe the framework of political and administrative accountability in the EU</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discuss how the nature of the executive politics may have changed over the recent crises, with a special focus on Brexit.</li> </ul>

Week 8: Legislative politics in the EU

In this week, we conceive of the EU as a bicameral political system, where the European Parliament is directly elected by the voters (lower house) and the Council represents the interests of national governments (upper house). We will get to know the rules that govern coalition-building and decision-making in each of these two 'chambers'. Subsequently, we study the interactions between European Parliament and the Council in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.

*Lecture*

The lecture begins with a review of week 3 (Legislatures). We discuss the role of the European Parliament and the Council vis-à-vis the European Commission. Can we classify the EU's legislature as either strong or weak? Next, we look into each of the two legislative bodies separately: What is the relation between the plenary and committees or work groups? How are information, amendment and voting rights allocated? Which interests are represented in each of the two bodies? Is there a role for party politics? How are coalitions formed, and how does that affect policy making? Finally, we take on a truly bicameral perspective by asking how Council and European Parliament interact when making EU law. Is the inter-institutional relation characterized by conflict or cooperation?

*Classes*

In classes, we study the relevance of the so-called trilogues. For long, it has been an informal, yet institutionalized practice that delegates from the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission meet early on in the legislative process to agree on a compromise. In the treaty of Lisbon, this procedure has been formalized. What are advantages of this fast-track procedure? How does it affect the relation between European Parliament and Council? Does it affect the internal dynamics in each of the two legislative bodies?

*Learning objectives of week 8*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Theories that explain the formation of legislative coalitions</li> <li>Theories of bicameralism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Composition of European Parliament and Council</li> <li>Rules of procedure and internal organization of European Parliament and Council</li> <li>Ordinary Legislative Procedure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discuss how informal bicameral negotiations (such as the 'trilogue') affect patterns of conflict and coalition within parliament</li> </ul>

Week 9: Elections and democracy in the EU

The EU has been accused of having a democratic deficit. This week's lecture deals with the institutional foundations of this accusation. The electoral connection between voters and the decision makers in Brussels will be in the center of this bloc. We are going to discuss the extent of the democratic deficit and whether it has its roots in a lack of a European public sphere or in particular features of the EU's institutional design.

*Lecture*

This lecture addresses the following questions: What do Europeans think about the current state of integration? How are Members of the European Parliament elected? Do they represent the interests of their voters? Are governments, when acting in the Council, accountable to their national parliaments? In answering these questions, we will begin with a review of weeks 2 (electoral systems) and 3 (legislatures), which allows us to classify the EU's institutions from a comparative perspective. Next, we will see that the additional level of government creates additional challenges for democratic representation. Voters are often more concerned with punishing their national governments when casting their vote at European elections. Ministers enjoy a significant level of discretion when negotiating in the Council. And the media's attention is frequently lower for EU politics as compared to national politics. The lecture will present each of these challenges and point towards its institutional foundations.

*Classes*

In the class, the students will be trained to evaluate the democratic quality of the EU's political system. On the one hand, this includes an evaluation of the state of the union against normative democratic theory. On the other hand, it includes a discussion of whether or not institutional reforms might be able to improve the democratic quality of EU politics.

*Learning objectives of week 9*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluate the democratic quality of a multilevel political system</li> <li>Understand the basic concepts of principal agent theory (agency drift, oversight mechanisms)</li> <li>Know the theory of second-order elections</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relevance of parties and political groups in the European Parliament</li> <li>Public opinion on the state of integration</li> <li>Rules for and voting patterns in European Parliament elections</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discuss the democratic quality of the EU</li> <li>Discuss how electoral rules affect voter representation in the European Parliament</li> </ul>

Week 10: Judicial politics in the EU

In Western nation states, we take the powers of the judiciary for granted. In most cases, we observe an independent, hierarchical and differentiated court system as well as a constitutional court that constrains legislative and executive power. So far, we have learned that member states delegated significant legislative competences to the EU but only limited competences to execute and implement law. But to what extent has judicial oversight over legislation and implementation been integrated? In this lecture, we will describe the powers of the European Court of Justice and see how it obtained increasing independence over the course of European integration.

*Lecture*

In the lecture, we will begin by describing the EU's court system, specifically the European Court of Justice, with regard to its composition and most important procedures. We will place special emphasis on the institutionalized relation between the European Court of Justice and the member states, the so-called 'institutionalist model' of judicial politics (Dyevre 2010). Once we have delineated the court's role in the EU's present political system, we will see how it has established and institutionalized such powerful norms as the direct effect and the supremacy of EU law.

*Classes*

The trial exam question will be published a week before the deadline, which is Wednesday 12 o'clock in week 10. Trial exams should be answered individually and can be no longer than 2800 words. Class teachers prepare very short comments on the individual exam. Collective feedback will be given in class.

*Learning objectives of week 10*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand the 'institutionalist model' of judicial politics</li> <li>Understand the basics of legal integration theory and its nexus to integration theories (week 8)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Powers, composition and procedures of the European Court of Justice.</li> <li>History of legal integration (key decision by the ECJ).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply integration theories to legal integration</li> <li>Apply institutionalist model of judicial politics to the ECJ</li> </ul>

**Bloc 3: International institutions**

In the third bloc, we move beyond the nation state and introduce various approaches to study the question of why states choose to cooperate and how they institutionalized their cooperation. We investigate how international organizations act and whether they can reach a significant level of independence from the member states. A crucial question is why sovereign nation states comply with or violate international rules. The classes in this block apply the theories to security, trade, monetary, fiscal and climate politics.

Week 11: Why do states create international institutions?

The first week in this block addresses some of the fundamental questions of the creation and maintenance of international cooperation. The main focus is to give a deeper understanding of the rational choice institutionalism and how insights have been utilized and translated in the IR literature to explain why states choose to cooperate. The particular focus is on liberal institutionalism and how and why states create international organizations and regimes. It is

important to have an understanding of the role of preferences, level of information and trust in order to understand the strength and durability of the international organizations that states create in order to regulate their interactions.

*Lecture*

This lecture addresses three primary questions: Why do states choose to cooperate? What can explain the decisions to create international institutions? Which design do they choose for the organization? The theoretical backbone in this lecture is rational choice institutionalism. Based on rational choice and game theoretical insights, the lecture presents a framework that can be utilized to answer the three above mentioned questions.

*Classes*

In the lecture, we introduced a theoretical rational choice framework to explain why states cooperate and why they form institutions. In the classes, we want you to utilize this framework to analyze the cooperation in the NATO alliance and discuss how this organization works and how it can be changed in the future.

*Learning objectives of week 11*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Describe RC institutionalism</li> <li>Understand the logics in the theory and its approach to the formation and design of international organizations</li> <li>Describe some of the consequences that institutional designs have on states' behavior</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge of the organization of NATO as an example of an international organization</li> <li>Describe factors that might shape international organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply institutionalist explanations to explain why NATO was created and how it can be changed in the future to meet new security threats</li> </ul>

Week 12: Regional integration

A subfield in the study of international institutions is the study of regional integration, especially European integration. In fact, regional integration scholars developed their own theories, most importantly neofunctionalism and Liberal intergovernmentalism. The goal of this lecture is to understand these two theories and their relation to the different strands of neoinstitutionalism.

*Lecture*

Since the scholars of European integration have been at the core of developing regional integration theories, Europe will be in the center of this lecture, too. The lecture offers a short introduction of the European integration process, focusing on the delegation of competences, the choice of institutions as well as enlargement. With the key historic facts under our belly, we proceed to the two central integration theories, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Both theories are then applied to the main developments of European integration. Since both theories draw on institutional theories, they will be used to give us an understanding of the overall institutional balance between the institutions and its member states.

*Classes*

In the class, we will apply the neofunctionalist and the liberal intergovernmentalist theories to explain the politics of the ‘Euro-crisis’. You will compare the two perspectives and reflect on the usefulness of the theories and whether we should expect ‘institutional change’ in response to the ‘Euro-crisis’.

*Learning objectives of week 12*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Understand neofunctionalism, especially the role of spill-over logics</li> <li>• Understand liberal intergovernmentalism</li> <li>• Understand the logics in the two theories and their relation to institutional theory</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Knowledge of the European integration process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apply NF and LI theories to explain the integration processes and their dynamics with a focus on the Euro-crisis</li> </ul>

Week 13: How do international institutions work?

The third week of this block begins with an overview of types of international organizations. In other words, it focuses on the observed variation of international institutions. International organizations differ by scope, decision rules and membership, but also by the discretion they enjoy vis-à-vis their member states. Consequently, the lecture discusses the degree of autonomy that international organizations can reach and have reached from different theoretical angles.

*Lecture*

The lecture discusses the discretion and power of international organizations from different theoretical perspectives. Starting from a rational choice perspective, it will be demonstrated that member states’ underlying interests are key to understanding the organization’s discretion and

effectiveness. Yet, for other, essentially constructivist approaches, norms and culture are considered relevant for understanding discretion and effectiveness.

*Classes*

The trial exam question will be published a week before the deadline, which is Wednesday 12 o'clock in week 10. Trial exams should be answered in groups and can be no longer than 2800 words. Class teachers prepare very short comments on the individual exam. Collective feedback will be given in class.

*Learning objectives of week 13*

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand the logics in the theory and its approach to the formation and design of international organizations and whether states can continue to control institutions</li> <li>Understand some of the consequences that institutional designs have on states' behavior</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge of the types of international organizations and their institutional differences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply rationalist and constructivist approaches to evaluate the discretion of different international organizations (e.g. IMF, WHO)</li> </ul>

Week 14: International trade agreements

The remaining lectures focus on two of the most prominent current challenges to international cooperation. We begin with free trade and the recent wave of negotiations over so-called preferential trading agreements (PTAs). Trade agreements offer several interesting features to students of international politics. First, economic benefits frequently materialize only in the long run. Second, they cause winners and losers within nation states. Third, they are negotiated within a web of existing international treaties that constrain member states, most prominently by being a member states of the EU.

*Lecture*

The lecture has two objectives. First, it introduces the most prominent theoretical approaches to understanding free trade agreements. In particular, it covers the political economy of free trade with a focus on negotiating institutions to safeguard free trade. Second, the lecture offers a crash course into the world of free trade, covering the typical content of a free trade agreement, the competences of the EU and the relevance of ratification requirements. In doing so, it refers back to block 2 on the EU's political system.

*Classes*

The class studies the Brexit negotiations with a focus on domestic constraints. The theoretical starting point for the discussion is a classic article by Putnam. Empirically, the focus is on the relevance of domestic ratification in EU member states as well as on the constraints faced by the British government.

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand the political economy of free trade negotiations.</li> <li>Understand the negotiation theories, especially the so-called two-level games</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge of the free trade agreements, i.e. the WTO rules and the typical content of PTAs</li> <li>Knowledge of the role EU institutions in PTAs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply the two-level game framework to the Brexit negotiations</li> </ul>

*Week 15: Climate politics and Wrap up*

The last part of the course addresses the crucial global challenge: climate politics. Global warming will be introduced as a dilemma between nation states. Furthermore, we look into the Paris agreement and discuss its future against the theoretical knowledge that we have acquired over the course of the last weeks.

We reserve 45 minutes for summarizing the content of the lecture and for exam preparation.

*Lecture (45 min)*

The lecture introduces the international dilemma in combating global warming as well as the main characteristics of the recent treaties, such as the Kyoto, Copenhagen and Paris agreements.

*Classes (45 min)*

Given the inherent compliance issue of global climate politics, we discuss the hopes placed by some scholars into transnational and regional climate action. Specifically, we ask the question of which role states can play in incentivizing and coordinating these activities.

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand global climate politics as a dilemma situation with inherent compliance and free-riding issues</li> <li>Understand theoretical approaches to transnational governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge of the Copenhagen and Paris agreements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Apply theories of transnational governance to international climate politics</li> </ul>

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## 5. Readings for Political Institutions

Students are expected to acquire the following book:

Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) *The political system of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan (3<sup>rd</sup> edition), pp. 1-18, 23-48, 49-74, 75-104, 105-157.

Readings in compendium and online:

Abbott, K.W., & Snidal, D. (1998) 'Why states act through formal international organizations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1): 3-32 (29 pages) (online article).

Alesina, A., Angeloni, I. & Schuknecht, L. (2005) 'What does the European Union do?', *Public Choice*, 123(3): 275-319 (44 pages) (online article).

Beramendi, P. (2007) 'Federalism', in Boix, C. & Stokes, S. (eds.), *Oxford Handbook on Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 752-781 (30 pages) (copy in compendium).

Benoit, K. (2007) 'Electoral laws as political consequences', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10: 363-388 (36 pages) (online article).

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2004). *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Cornell University Press, pp. 1-45 (45 pages) (copy in compendium).

Caramani, D. (2014) 'Party systems', chapter 13 in Caramani, D. (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 216-229 (14 pages) (copy in compendium).

Dalton, R.J. (2015) 'Politics in Germany', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. *Comparative politics today. A world view*, 11<sup>th</sup> ed. Pierman, pp. 279-284, 296, 304-308 (12 pages) (copy in compendium).

De Mesquita, B.B. (2014). *Principles of international politics*. Sage, pp. 267-291+353-380. (53 pages) (E-book via AU-Library).

Dyevre, A. (2010) 'Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: Towards a general theory of judicial behaviour', *European Political Science Review*, 2(2): 297-327 (31 pages) (online article).

Follesdal, A. & Hix, S. (2006) 'Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(3): 533-562 (30 pages) (online article).

Gallager, M. (2014) 'Electoral systems', chapter 10 in Caramani, D. (ed.), *Comparative politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-172 (6 pages) (copy in compendium).

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- Hall, P.A. & Taylor, R.C.R. (1996) 'Political science and the three new institutionalisms', *Political Studies* 44(5): 936-955 (20 pages) (online article).
- Hale, T., & Roger, C. (2014) 'Orchestration and transnational climate governance', *The Review of International Organizations*, 9(1): 59-82 (23 pages) (online article).
- Hargreaves, S. & Homewood, M.J. (2016) *EU law concentrate: Law revision and study guide*. Oxford University Press, pp. 1-20 (20 pages) (copy in compendium).
- Hellwig, T. & Samuels, D. (2008) 'Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes', *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(1): 65-90 (26 pages) (online article).
- Keohane, R.O. (1984) 'After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world economy', reprinted in Mingst, K.A. & Snyder, J.L. (eds.) *Essential readings in world politics*. New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 338-354 (17 pages) (copy in compendium).
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