

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

COMPENDIUM

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1. Introduction – the goals and aims of the course

This compendium is developed for the BA course *Political Institutions: Western countries, The European Union and International Organizations* (PI). The course deals with political systems and their interactions. Its focus is on providing students with an understanding of how political systems work as well as the causes and consequences of institutional differences for the representativeness and efficiency of political decision-making processes.

The course contains three core elements: 1) national political systems and institutional differences between these systems; 2) regional institutions, focusing on the political system of the EU; and 3) global institutions and the interaction between political systems at different levels.

The first block of the course provides insights into the political systems of selected countries and the significance of key institutional differences across political systems. This includes differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, federal states and unitary states, and the modes of operation in parliaments and governments.

The second block of the course lifts the level of analysis to the regional institutional level, focusing on the EU's political system, its institutions and the core policies that have been developed. After an introduction to why states form regional institutions, and how we can compare regional institutions, we introduce the political system of the EU. In the block, we examine the executive, legislative and judicial politics in the EU. In addition, the block deals with the current state of democracy in the EU and elections to the European Parliament.

The third block of the course concentrates on the interaction between political systems and global-level international institutions. In particular, we focus on theories aimed at explaining the formation and operation of international organization, addressing the question of whether international institutions are under 'control' by states or whether they can get a 'life of their own'.

The goal of the course is to give students a general knowledge of how political institutions at various levels of governance function, develop and influence democratic representation and decision-making. Specifically, the course aims to give students the following competences:

- The student must be able to describe the political system of selected Western countries, the EU, regional institutions, and international organizations.
- The student must be able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in different institutional contexts.
- The student must be able to compare key empirical differences between political systems, identifying their differences and similarities.
- The student must be able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories.

- The student must be able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.
- The student must be able to apply the theories of the course to analyze empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.

These overall learning objectives can be divided into three major headings (as illustrated in Table 1): theoretical knowledge, empirical knowledge and an ability to apply theories to empirical material.


Table 1. Overall learning objectives for the course

Theory	Empirical knowledge	Application
<p>The student must be able to describe selected theories of how political actors interact in and through political institutions.</p> <p>The student must be able to compare selected theories about the relationship between political actors and institutions and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these theories</p>	<p>The student must be able to describe the political system of selected Western countries, the EU and selected international organizations.</p> <p>The student must be able to compare key empirical differences between political systems, identifying their differences and similarities.</p>	<p>The student must be able to apply the general methods of political science to independently and systematically analyze issues regarding institutions, political systems and their interaction.</p> <p>The student must be able to apply the theories of the course to analyze empirical material and issues regarding institutions and their interaction. The goal here is to independently and systematically discuss and assess the relevance and scope of application of these theories.</p>

2. The relation of the course to other courses on the BA in Political Science

The course is closely connected to other BA courses in political science at Aarhus University. Figure 1 places PI in relation to other courses taught on the BA education through a simplified version of an input-output model. It should be noted that the model is a simplified presentation and certain overlaps will occur between the different courses. *General Political Science* (Almen Statskundskab) deals with the input side of the political system. It presents knowledge of and theories about social cleavages, opinion formation, the role of public opinion and political participation. *Public Policy* (Offentlig Politik) focuses on the outcome side – political decisions, policies, regimes and reforms that are treated as the dependent variable. *International Relations* (International Politik) deals with the international systems and how states interact and conduct their foreign policies. The focus is on the structure of the international system and the role of conflicts and cooperation between states. *Political Institutions* focuses on what happens in the so-called ‘black box’ between demands expressed in civil society and policies influencing the living conditions in a society.

Figure 1: The PI course role in the BA program



3. The organization of the course

Studying what happens in a black box is per definition difficult. In PI, we open the black box by studying the way power is organized in central political institutions and how they operate in order to reach political decisions. We thus study the role of the structures as well as the modus operandi of selected political institutions.

The classic input-output models are primarily limited to and aimed at understanding domestic politics and distributive processes on this level. However, to give a comprehensive understanding of how the most important political institutions are structured and function, we need to acknowledge that modern governance is multilayered. There are multiple layers of authority from municipalities over nation states to supranational organizations. PI needs to draw on insight from Comparative Politics (CP) as well as International Relations (IR) to understand these different layers of authority and the way power is structured within as well as between states. The overall theoretical framework used to bridge CP and IR is theories of institutionalism. Institutionalism focuses on how institutions are created and their effects on behavior and policies.

PI is organized according to the different layers of governance in modern developed democracies.

We begin the course with a general introduction to the concept of institutions and theories about the relationship between actors and institutions (L1). This general framework is relevant for all aspects of the course even though a somewhat different terminology is used in the different research traditions.

- In the first block (weeks 2-5), we focus on the national level of governance. Empirically, we focus on Western democracies when applying typologies to describe national political institutions such as electoral systems, legislatures and executives. Throughout this block, we will discuss institutions of the same five Western democracies (Denmark, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, United States). Additional countries may be discussed but this forms our core.
- The second block (weeks 6-12) deals with regional institutions (NAFTA, ASEAN, Andean Community, and the EU). We focus on the European Union as an example of supranational, regional-level governance. The political system of EU will be explained in detail. This means that we will not only cover the central institutions and policies of the EU but also address the current state of democracy in the EU. After an introduction, the block covers executive, legislative and judicial politics in the EU.
- The third block (weeks 13-15) takes one further step towards studying political institutions beyond the nation state. Based on institutional theories, we discuss why states choose to create international organizations and whether and how states can control international organizations when they are first created. Empirically, we will draw on examples from the UN and NATO.

Table 2. Organization of the course: Lectures and classes

Week	Lecturer	Theme
L1 (week 5) January 29	AK	<p>Introduction: Institutionalism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) 'Political science and the three new institutionalisms', <i>Political Studies</i> 44(5): 936-955 (20 pages) (online article). Compendium comments (supplementary reading).
C1		<p>Institutionalism and institutional change</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Koning, Edward Anthony (2016) 'The three institutionalisms and institutional dynamics: Understanding endogenous and exogenous change', <i>Journal of Public Policy</i>, 36(4): 639-664 (26 pages) (online article).
Block 1: Political institutions in Western countries		
L2 (week 6) February 5	RS	<p>Electoral systems and party systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Repetition: Gallagher, M. (2014) 'Electoral systems', chapter 10 in Caramani (ed.), <i>Comparative Politics, 3rd ed.</i> New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-172 (6 pages) (copy in compendium). Caramani, D. (2014) 'Party systems', chapter 13 in Caramani (ed.), <i>Comparative Politics, 3rd ed.</i> New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 216-229 (14 pages) (copy in compendium). Benoit, K. (2007) 'Electoral laws as political consequences', <i>Annual Review of Political Science</i> 10: 363-388 (36 pages) (online article).
C2		<p>Electoral systems and Ethnic Heterogeneity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lublin, David (2015) 'Electoral Systems, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and Party System Fragmentation', <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> 47(2): 373-389 (17 pages) (online article). Lijphart, A. (2012) <i>Patterns of Democracy</i>. New Haven: Yale University, chapter 8, pp. 130-157 (28 pages) Lijphart, A. (2012) <i>Patterns of Democracy</i>. New Haven: Yale University, chapter 5, pp. 60-78 (19 pages)
L3 (week 7) February 12	AK	<p>Legislatures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sieberer, U. (2011) 'The institutional power of Western European parliaments: A multidimensional analysis', <i>West European Politics</i>, 34(4): 731-754 (24 pages) (online article).
C3		Classifying legislatures

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dalton, R.J. (2015) 'Politics in Germany', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. (eds.) <i>Comparative politics today. A world view, 11th ed.</i> Pearson, pp. 279-284, 296, 304-308 + notes 316-317 (14 pages) (copy in compendium). • Schain, M.A. (2015) 'Politics in France', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. <i>Comparative politics today. A world view, 11th ed.</i> Pearson, pp. 223-224, 251-257 + notes 265-267 (12 pages) (copy in compendium). • Lijphart, A. (2012) <i>Patterns of Democracy</i>. New Haven: Yale University, chapter 11, pp. 187-203 (17 pages)
L4 (week 8) February 19	AK	<p>Government regimes and accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hellwig, T. & Samuels, D. (2007) 'Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes', <i>British Journal of Political Science</i>, 38(1): 65-90 (26 pages) (online article).
C4		<p>Electoral accountability in the US</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kousser, T. & Ranney, A. (2015) 'Politics in the United States', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. (eds.) <i>Comparative politics today. A world view, 11th ed.</i>, Pearson, pp. 713-715, 734-739 + notes 748-749 (11 pages) (copy in compendium) • Trethan, P. (2017, March 06) 'Powers and duties of the United States Congress. Setting the rules and laying down the law', ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/powers-of-the-united-states-congress-3322280 (also shared on blackboard) (2 pages) • Trethan, P. (2017, April 04) 'The congressional committee system. Who's doing what?', ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/the-congressional-committee-system-3322274 (also shared on blackboard) (2 pages) • Longley, R. (2017, Feb. 23) 'Presidentially appointed jobs requiring Senate approval. That Senate part can get sticky', ThoughtCo. https://www.thoughtco.com/presidentially-appointed-jobs-requiring-senate-approval-3322227 (also shared on blackboard) (2 pages) • Lijphart, A. (2012) <i>Patterns of Democracy</i>. New Haven: Yale University, chapter 7, pp. 105-129 (25 pages)
L5 (week 9) February 26	RS	<p>Federalism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loughlin, J. (2014) 'Federal and local government institutions', in Caramani (ed.) <i>Comparative politics, 3rd ed.</i> New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 181-196 (16 pages) (copy in compendium). • Beramendi, P. (2007) 'Federalism', in Boix, C. & Stokes, S. (eds.), <i>Oxford handbook on comparative politics</i>. New York

		& Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 752-781 (30 pages) (copy in compendium).
C5		<p>Representation in federal systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wlezien, C. & Soroka, S.N. (2011) 'Federalism and public responsiveness to policy', <i>Publius: The Journal of Federalism</i> 41(1): 31-52 (22 pages) (online article). • Lijphart, A. (2012) <i>Patterns of Democracy</i>. New Haven: Yale University, chapter 10, pp. 174-186 (13 pages)
Block 2: Regional institutions		
L6 (week 10) March 5	DB	<p>Regional integration across the globe</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Söderbaum, F. (2009) 'Comparative Regional Integration and Regionalism.', in Landman and Robinson (eds) <i>The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics</i>. London: Sage, pp. 477-496. (20 pages) (copy in compendium)
C6		<p>Trial exam</p> <p>No readings: Exam questions from 2018 (on blackboard). - activity will be group work giving feedback on trial exams</p>
L7 (week 11) March 12	DB	<p>European Integration – sui generis?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moravcsik, A. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism', in A. Wiener & T. Diez (eds.), <i>European integration theory</i>, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67-87 (21 pages) (copy in compendium). • Niemann, A. & Schmitter, P.C. (2009) 'Neo-functionalism', in A. Wiener & T. Diez (eds.), <i>European integration theory</i>, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-65 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).
C7		<p>Integration after the euro-crisis</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis', <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 22(2): 177-192 (16 pages) (online article). • Smeets, S, Jaschke, A. Beach, D. (forthcoming) The role of the EU institutions in establishing the ESM: Institutional leadership under a veil of intergovernmentalism. <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i>. (In press: max 20 pages expected) (online article)
L8 (week 12) March 19	RS	<p>The political system of the EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3rd edition), pp. 1-18. (18 pages)

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D. & Berthold Rittberger (2015) 'The European Union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation', <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i> 22(6):764-782. (19 pages) (online article)
C8		<p>Efficiency, Success, and Failure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McCormick, J. and Zielonka J. (2016) The European Union: Success or Failure? , In: Zimmermann, H. and Dür, A. <i>Key Controversies in European Integration</i>. pp. 10-19. (10 pages) • Dinan, D. and Persson M. (2016) The Political Efficiency of the EU, In: Zimmermann, H. and Dür, A. <i>Key Controversies in European Integration</i>. pp. 29-37. (9 pages)
L9 (week 13) March 26	RS	<p>Executive politics in the EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3rd edition), pp. 23-48. (26 pages)
C9		<p>Inside the Commission</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Blom-Hansen J. and Daniel Finke (forthcoming) 'Reputation and Organizational Politics: Inside the EU Commission', <i>Journal of Politics</i>, (In press: max 20 pages expected) (online article).
L10 (week 14) April 2	RS	<p>Legislative politics in the EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3rd edition), pp. 49-75. (27 pages)
C10		<p>Trilogue and fast-track procedure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rasmussen, A. & Reh, C. (2013) 'The consequences of concluding codecision early', <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i> 20 (7): 1006-1024 (19 pages) (online article).
L11 (week 15) April 9	AK	<p>Elections and democracy in the EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3rd edition), pp. 105-158. (54 pages)
C11		<p>Democratic deficit</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beach, D., Hansen, K. M. & Vinæs, M. (2017) 'How Campaigns Enhance European Issues Voting During

		European Parliament Elections’, <i>Political Science Research and Methods</i> 6 (4):791-808. (19 pages) (online article)
L12 (week 17) April 23	DB	<p>Judicial politics in the EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) <i>The political system of the European Union</i>. Palgrave Macmillan (3rd edition), pp. 75-101. (26 pages)
C12		<p>Comparative judicial integration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alter, K., & Helfer, L. (2010) Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice. <i>International Organization</i>, 64(4): 563-592. (30 pages) (online article)
Block 3: International Organizations		
L13 (week 18) April 30	DB	<p>Why do states create international institutions?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Keohane, R.O. (2011) ‘After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy’, reprinted in K.A. Mingst & J.L. Snyder (eds.), <i>Essential readings in world politics</i>, 4th edition (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 292-307 (16 pages) (copy in compendium). Jupille, J, Mattli, W. and D. Snidal (2017) Dynamics of Institutional Choice. in Orfeo (ed) <i>International Politics and Institutions in Time</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.117-143 (27 pages) (online chapter)
C13		<p>International security cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wallander, C. (2000) Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War. <i>International Organization</i> 54(4): 705-735. (31 pages) (online article) Becker, J. and Malesky, E. (2017) The Continent or the “Grand Large”? Strategic Culture and Operational Burden-Sharing in NATO, <i>International Studies Quarterly</i>, 61(1): 163–180. (18 pages) (online article)
L14 (week 19) May 7	DB	<p>How do international institutions work?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hawkins, D. et al (2006) Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. in Hawkins et al (eds) <i>Delegation and Agency in International Organizations</i>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-38. (36 pages) (copy in compedium) Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. (2004) <i>Rules for the world</i>. Cornell Press. Ch. 1 and 2. (46 pages) (copy in compedium).
C14		Are they out of control?

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elsig, M. (2010) Principal–agent theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex agency and ‘missing delegation’. <i>European Journal of International Relations</i>, 17(3): 495 – 517. (23 pages) (online article) • Johnson, T. (2013) Institutional Design and Bureaucrats’ Impact on Political Control. <i>Journal of Politics</i>, 75(1): 183-197. (15 pages) (online article)
L15 (week 20) May 14	AK	<p>Conclusions and exam</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No readings
C15		<p>Thinking like a 'rationalist', 'historical institutionalist' and sociological institutionalist'</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reread Hall and Taylor from L1.

PI is organized as most other BA courses with four hours teaching per week: two hours of lectures and two hours of class discussions. The exam is a six-hour written exam, and after the course, students are expected to be able to describe political institutions and theories about them and to be able to compare these institutions and theories in a theoretically informed empirical analysis. The descriptive element of the course is thus strong, giving students an opportunity to gather empirical knowledge of various political institutions on the national as well as international level of governance.

To make the teaching activities support the achievement of the learning objectives, lectures will focus on providing knowledge of concepts, typologies and theories for defining, classifying and understanding the function and structure of political institutions, while classes will focus on applying these concepts, typologies and theories on empirical material.

Lectures as well as classes will be taught in English. The final exam can be written in Danish or English.

Lecturers and coordinators

Derek Beach (DB) (coordinator), Lecturer

Ann-Kristin Kölln (AK) (coordinator), Lecturer

Roman Senninger (RS) (coordinator), Lecturer

If you have any practical questions, you are welcome to contact Ann-Kristin Kölln (koelln@ps.au.dk).

Class instructors

David Delfs Erbo Andersen (dandersen@ps.au.dk)

Jonas Gejl Pedersen (gejl@ps.au.dk)

Ann-Kristin Kölln (koelln@ps.au.dk)

Casper Sakstrup (cas@ps.au.dk)

Roman Senninger (rsenninger@ps.au.dk)

5. Readings for Political Institutions

Students are expected to acquire the following book:

Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011) *The political system of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan (3rd edition), pp. 1-18, 23-48, 49-74, 75-101, 105-158.

Readings in compendium and online:

Alter, K., & Helfer, L. (2010) Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the European Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice. *International Organization*, 64(4): 563-592. (30 pages) (online article)

Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. (2004) *Rules for the world*. Cornell Press. Ch. 1 and 2. (46 pages) (copy in compendium).

Beach, D., Hansen, K. M. & Vinæs, M. (2017) 'How Campaigns Enhance European Issues Voting During European Parliament Elections', *Political Science Research and Methods* 6 (4):791-808. (19 pages) (online article)

Becker, J. and Malesky, E. (2017) The Continent or the "Grand Large"? Strategic Culture and Operational Burden-Sharing in NATO, *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(1): 163–180. (18 pages) (online article)

Benoit, K. (2007) 'Electoral laws as political consequences', *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 363-388 (36 pages) (online article).

Beramendi, P. (2007) 'Federalism', in Boix, C. & Stokes, S. (eds.), *Oxford handbook on comparative politics*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 752-781 (30 pages) (copy in compendium).

Blom-Hansen J. and Daniel Finke (forthcoming) 'Reputation and Organizational Politics: Inside the EU Commission', *Journal of Politics*, (In press: max 20 pages expected) (online article).

Caramani, D. (2014) 'Party systems', chapter 13 in Caramani (ed.), *Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 216-229 (14 pages) (copy in compendium).

Dalton, R.J. (2015) 'Politics in Germany', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. (eds.) *Comparative politics today. A world view*, 11th ed. Pearson, 279-284, 296, 304-308 + notes 316-317 (14 pages) (copy in compendium).

Dinan, D. and Persson M. (2016) The Political Efficiency of the EU, In: Zimmermann, H. and Dür, A. *Key Controversies in European Integration*. pp. 29-37. (9 pages)

Elsig, M. (2010) Principal–agent theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex agency and 'missing delegation'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 17(3): 495 – 517. (23 pages) (online article)

Gallager, M. (2014) 'Electoral systems', chapter 10 in Caramani (ed.), *Comparative Politics, 3rd ed.* New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-172 (6 pages) (copy in compendium).

Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) 'Political science and the three new institutionalisms', *Political Studies* 44(5): 936-955 (20 pages) (online article).

Hawkins, D. et al (2006) Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory. in Hawkins et al (eds) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-38. (36 pages) (copy in compendium)

Hellwig, T. & Samuels, D. (2007) 'Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes', *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(1): 65-90 (26 pages) (online article).

Johnson, T. (2013) Institutional Design and Bureaucrats' Impact on Political Control. *Journal of Politics*, 75(1): 183-197. (15 pages) (online article)

Jupille, J, Mattli, W. and D. Snidal (2017) Dynamics of Institutional Choice. in Orfeo (ed) *International Politics and Institutions in Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.117-143 (27 pages) (online chapter)

Keohane, R.O. (2011) 'After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy', reprinted in K.A. Mingst & J.L. Snyder (eds.), *Essential readings in world politics*, 4th edition (New York: W.W. Norton), pp. 292-307 (16 pages) (copy in compendium).

Koning, Edward Anthony (2016) 'The three institutionalisms and institutional dynamics: Understanding endogenous and exogenous change', *Journal of Public Policy*, 36(4): 639-664 (26 pages) (online article).

Kousser, T. & Ranney, A. (2015) 'Politics in the United States', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. (eds.) *Comparative politics today. A world view, 11th ed.*, Pearson, pp. 713-715, 734-739 + notes 748-749 (11 pages) (copy in compendium)

Lijphart, A. (2012) *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University., pp. 60-78; 105-129; 130-157; 174-186; 187-203 (102 pages) (online book)

Longley, R. (2017, Feb. 23) 'Presidentially appointed jobs requiring Senate approval. That Senate part can get sticky', ThoughtCo. <https://www.thoughtco.com/presidentially-appointed-jobs-requiring-senate-approval-3322227> (also shared on blackboard) (2 pages)

Loughlin, J. (2014) 'Federal and local government institutions', in Caramani (ed.) *Comparative politics, 3rd ed.* New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 181-196 (16 pages) (copy in compendium).

Lublin, David (2015) 'Electoral Systems, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and Party System Fragmentation', *British Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 373-389 (17 pages) (online article).

McCormick, J. and Zielonka J. (2016) The European Union: Success or Failure? , In: Zimmermann, H. and Dür, A. *Key Controversies in European Integration*. pp. 10-19. (10 pages)

Moravcsik, A. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism', in A. Wiener & T. Diez (eds.), *European integration theory*, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67-87 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).

Niemann, A. & Schmitter, P.C. (2009) 'Neo-functionalism', in A. Wiener & T. Diez (eds.), *European integration theory*, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-65 (21 pages) (copy in compendium).

Rasmussen, A. & Reh, C. (2013) 'The consequences of concluding codecision early', *Journal of European Public Policy* 20 (7): 1006-1024 (19 pages) (online article).

Schain, M.A. (2015) 'Politics in France', in Powell, G.B., Dalton, R.J. & Strøm, K. *Comparative politics today. A world view*, 11th ed. Pearson, pp. 223-224, 251-257 + notes 265-267 (12 pages) (copy in compendium).

Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) 'Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(2): 177-192 (16 pages) (online article).

Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D. & Berthold Rittberger (2015) 'The European Union as a system of differentiated integration: interdependence, politicization and differentiation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 22(6):764-782. (19 pages) (online article)

Sieberer, U. (2011) 'The institutional power of Western European parliaments: A multidimensional analysis', *West European Politics*, 34(4): 731-754 (24 pages) (online article).

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Total number of pages: 969